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Grelling's paradox of heterological predicate adjectives is as follows. 
Some predicate adjectives refer to themselves. For example, 'English' is 
English, 'polysyllabic' is polysyllabic, and 'orthographic' is orthographic. 
Let us refer to all such self-referring predicate adjectives as homological 
predicate adjectives. On the other hand, some predicate adjectives do not 
refer to themselves. For example, 'German' is not German, 'monosyllabic' 
is not monosyllabic, and 'misspelled' is not misspelled. Let us refer to all of 
these non-self-referring predicate adjectives as heterological predicate 
adjectives. Our newly introduced predicate adjectives 'homological' and 
'heterological' provide a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
partition of predicate adjectives. A predicate adjective is homological if 
and only if it is not heterological. 
We now must ask, are 'heterological' and 'homological' either 
heterological or homological? If 'heterological' is heterological then it is 
homological because it refers to itself. If 'heterological' is homological 
then it is heterological because of what it means to be homological. What 
follows is a self-contradiction. 'Heterological' is heterological if and only if 
it is not heterological. 
For some philosophers, Grelling's paradox is an antinomy, a self-
contradiction which results from an intuitively acceptable pattern of 
reasoning. As an antinomy, it calls for a revision in the responsible 
patterns of reasoning.! How much of a revision is called for depends on 
the method used to avoid the self-contradiction. 
Within an extensionalist philosophy, the most economical method 
comes from the work of Bertrand Russell and Alfred Tarski.2 It calls for a 
hierarchy of languages which are constructed so that any discussion of the 
referential structure of a given language is carried out in a different, more 
inclusive language. By being banished from the language in which we find 
our familiar self-referring predicate adjectives, 'heterological' and 
'homological' are not longer the subjects of a heterological/homological 
classification. 
1 Willard Van Orman Quine, T h e Ways of Paradox," The Ways of 
Paradox and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 7. 
2 Bertrand Russell, an Inquiry into Truth and Meaning (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1940); Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in 
Formalized Languages," Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 152-278. 
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Other philosophers have sought a less artificial means for avoiding 
the paradox. Among them is Gilbert Ryle.3 Ryle contends that the 
paradox can be avoided without a call for language-hierarchies. He too 
argues that the labels 'heterological' and 'homological' cannot properly be 
applied to themselves. His argument rests on three major points. First, 
'heterological' and 'homological' are introduced into the language as 
specially fabricated instruments for classifying philological epithets, not 
simply all predicate adjectives. Second, philological epithets are epithets 
which are appropriately applied to or withheld from linguistic expressions 
because they (the philological epithets) stand for philological properties. 
Finally, neither 'heterological' nor 'homological' are philological epithets 
because there are no philological properties for which they stand. 
The extensional solution of Russell and Tarski and the intentional 
solution of Ryle have at least one feature in common. Both attempt to 
exclude 'heterological' and 'homological' from the domain of labels which 
can properly be classified as either heterological or homological. Yet, 
there are serious problems with both solutions. The extensional solution is 
not only artificial, but fails to address the paradox as it arises within 
ordinary language. The intentional solution is equally unacceptable as we 
lack a principle of identity for individuating properties.4 In an attempt to 
overcome both of these problems, I propose that there is an explanation 
why 'heterological' and 'homological' are neither heterological nor 
homological which preserves the integrity of ordinary language without 
introducing a suspect ontology of properties. 
Rather than talk about properties, I talk about symbol systems.5 By a 
symbol system, I mean a symbol scheme correlated with some domain of 
objects. The labels of a symbol scheme are sets of utterances, inscriptions, 
or marks, and the scheme itself is a set of those labels. In a linguistic 
system, the labels are called predicates. 
The realm of a system is the set of objects with which the labels of the 
scheme are correlated. Which objects are actually correlated with which 
labels depends on the system, indeed on the realm and the correlation in 
effect. It is the correlation of the scheme with the realm which establishes 
3 Gilbert Ryle, "Heterologicality," Analysis, volume 11, number 3, (1951). 
Reprinted in Philosophy and Analysis, ed. Margaret MacDonald (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 45-53. 
4 Willard Van Orman Quine, "On the Individuation of Attributes," 
Theories and Things (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1981), pp. 100-112. 
5 For a more detailed discussion of the views I summarize here see Nelson 
Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: The Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1976), pp. 71-74 and Catherine Z. Elgin, With Reference to 
Reference (Indianapolis: The Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 37-
42. 
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the reference of the labels and enables the scheme to categorize its realm. 
In a linguistic system, a set or category of objects associated together 
under the reference of a predicate is called the extension of that predicate. 
A symbol system is a construct. The domain with which the labels of a 
system is correlated does not determine how the domain is to be 
categorized. In constructing a system, we determine the relevant 
categories. This is not to say that anything goes. There are constraints. 
The most basic of these is consistency. And when a system is to interpret 
the referential structure of a used body of discourse, such standards as 
fidelity to antecedent usage and relevance of categories come into play. 
Within the parameters of consistency, fidelity to antecedent usage, and 
relevance of categories, genuine and spurious systems can be 
differentiated. 
Fidelity to antecedent usage is satisfied when the system's application 
of a label agrees with that of competent speakers. But the system's criteria 
for determining the reference of the labels need not be antecedently 
recognized or implicitly employed. Where antecedent usage fails to 
determine how a label is to be applied, a genuine system is free to speak 
authoritatively. Systems are not constructed merely to reflect antecedent 
usage, but to extend and refine it as well. Yet, only genuine systems speak 
authoritatively in cases where antecedent usage is mute. 
The relevance of a system's categories depends on our interests. 
Different systems of categories serve different interests, and any 
judgment of the relevance of a system's categories must take into 
consideration the task we set before it. A classification of books by size 
may work for a small personal library, but would be quite wrong for a large 
public library. Again this is not to suggest that anything goes. It is simply 
to say that as our interests vary, so do the specific standards by which the 
relevance of a system's categories is to be judged. 
A symbol system is not the same thing as a language. The labels 
within a language usually belong to more than one system. Furthermore, a 
genuine system for interpreting a body of discourse within a language 
cannot be read of the language. The very words 'system,' 'scheme,' 'realm,' 
label,' 'reference,' 'predicate,' and 'extension' properly belong to semantic 
theory. In constructing a system, we are engaged in semantic theory. 
Accordingly, simple observation does not determine how the elements of a 
language are to be identified and classified in order to meet the needs of 
system construction. 
A systematic analysis of Grelling's paradox frees me from some of the 
usual categories for talking about the paradox, especially those categories 
which have figured in determining the reference of the labels involved. So 
I may dispense with the categories of predicate adjective and philological 
epithet. All that is required for the system to be faithful to ordinary usage, 
is that its applications of 'heterological' and 'homological' agree with those 
of competent speakers of the language. Moreover, within the parameter 
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of fidelity to antecedent usage, I may ascertain which categories are 
directly responsible for the paradox. Without begging any questions, I 
may then ask whether the system in which the paradox arises is a genuine 
or spurious system for interpreting the semantic structure of ordinary 
language. I can do so by focusing on the relevance of the system's 
categories for ordinary linguistic usage. If the categories responsible for 
the paradox fail to be relevant categories within ordinary linguistic usage, 
then the system in which the paradox arises is a spurious interpretation of 
that use. 
Let me refer to the system in which Grelling's paradox arises as the 
heterological/homological system. The realm of the heterological/ 
homological system may be roughly characterized as a set of predicates. 
These predicates themselves belong to systems, and it is within their 
respective systems that their reference is determined. Whether or not a 
predicate refers to itself is determined by some system. Accordingly the 
labels 'heterological' and 'homological' of our heterological/homological 
system may be defined as follows: 
Dl x is heterological iff there exists some system S such that 
x is a predicate in S and x does not refer to itself in S. 
D2 x is homological iff there exists some system S such that x 
is a predicate in S and x refers to itself in S. 
More precisely, the realm of the heterological/homological system is the 
set of predicates of systems. 
A few comments about the heterological/homological system are in 
order. First, the systematic applications of 'heterological' and 
'homological' do coincide with the applications of competent speakers of 
the language who have been exposed to their use. For example, 
'polysyllabic' remains homological because there is a philological system 
in which 'polysyllabic' is polysyllabic, and 'monosyllabic' is still 
heterological because there is a system in which 'monosyllabic' does not 
refer to itself. Second, the system is somewhat vague, but only to the 
extent that ordinary linguistic usage is. For example, it is not clear within 
the system whether 'short' is heterological or homological, but only 
because ordinary linguistic usage does not decide the issue. Finally, the 
system is inconsistent as 'heterological' and 'homological' are taken as 
predicates within the heterological/homological system simply because 
they are introduced through stipulative definitions. 
What this systematic analysis suggests is that the question concerning 
Grelling's paradox and ordinary language is not whether there is a system 
in which the paradox can arise. Clearly there is. The question is whether 
the system in which it arises is a genuine or spurious interpretation of 
ordinary linguistic usage. This is no small matter. If the 
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heterological/homological system is a spurious interpretation of ordinary 
linguistic usage, then it lacks the authority to call into question the 
consistency of ordinary linguistic usage. 
The heterological/homological system is a spurious interpretation of 
ordinary linguistic usage. The paradox arises because 'heterological' and 
'homological' are introduced as predicates within the system through 
stipulative definitions. However, not all of the sets which are 
systematically definable within a language are actual extensions of 
predicates within that language. In fact, neither 'heterological' nor 
'homological' are predicates of ordinary linguistic usage. The 
heterological/homological system is a spurious interpretation of ordinary 
linguistic usage because the crucial categories of heterological and 
homological predicates are not relevant categories of ordinary linguistic 
usage. 
All extensions of predicates are sets, but not all sets are extensions of 
predicates. 6 Drawing the distinction is one of the tasks of a theory of 
predication. Similarity and respects of similarity don't work. Upon 
recognition of this, one is left with little more to say than "it is the important 
sets that are the extensions of our predicates."7 
What makes a set important? Some philosophers appeal to ontology. 
The sets which are extensions of predicates are said to be natural kinds 
which are anchored in reality with properties; for a lack of properties, the 
other sets are said to be contrived, merely artificial collections. (In point of 
fact, this is Ryle's approach to the paradox.) But the arguments do not 
support the ontological thesis. The most that can reasonably be concluded 
is that the sets which are the extensions of predicates are the sets we take 
to be important. 
There is, then, no sharp distinction between sets which are the 
extensions of predicates and all other sets, between natural and artificial 
kinds. The sets we take to be important are those which belong to the 
systems which successfully satisfy our needs and interests. Since interests 
and needs vary over time and even within the linguistic community, we 
must stop short of claiming that there is one fixed set of predicates. 
Common sense, science, aesthetics, and law call for predicates which are 
tailored to their respective goals, and their status as predicates is local. 
Following this line of reasoning, the full range of sets within a language 
are to be considered candidates for extensions of predicates. But this does 
not imply that there is no distinction to be drawn. Which sets actually 
become extensions of predicates is significantly determined by the 
interests of the language users. Accordingly, the usage and linguistic 
intuitions of competent speakers of the language do provide evidence for 
deciding whether a given label is a predicate. 
6 The views summarized here come from Elgin, op. cit., pp. 29-35. 
7 Elgin, op. cit., p. 31. 
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Neither 'heterological' nor 'homological' are predicates of ordinary 
linguistic usage because the sets with which they are correlated are simply 
not important. To show this I will appeal to both linguistic usage and 
linguistic intuition. 
As Ryle points out, 'heterological' and 'homological' are introduced for 
the sole purpose of partitioning the predicates of ordinary discourse into 
two mutually exclusive sets.8 Lacking any other use, it does not logically 
follow that the sets themselves are important and their labels are 
predicates of the language. Hence, it simply does not logically follow that 
'heterological' and 'homological' are predicates of ordinary linguistic 
usage merely because they provide a mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive classification of the predicates of ordinary linguistic usage. 
However, having abandoned a firm ontological basis for 
differentiating natural and artificial kinds, the entire range of sets are 
candidates for predication. So it is not surprising that we may find 
'heterological' and 'homological' in the role of predicates by occupying the 
predicate end of sentences. Furthermore, if competent speakers of the 
language are informed of their use, they will, in most cases, be capable of 
judging the truth of such sentences. But the question here is not a matter 
of truth. The question is whether the truth matters. 
If current usage by competent speakers of a language is, as I above 
suggest, an indication of which sets are deemed important, then what is 
important about a self-referring predicate is not that it is a member of a set 
of self-referring predicates. What is important is how the predicate 
classifies itself, not that it is of a kind that classifies itself. In turn, how a 
predicate classifies itself is important only because it is a predicate within 
some genuine system. For example, it is true that 'orthographic' is a 
member of the set of self-referring predicates. But what is important to a 
competent speaker of the language is not simply that 'orthographic' is self-
referring. What is important is that 'orthographic' is orthographic, i.e., that 
it is spelled correctly. That 'polysyllabic* is a member of the set of self-
referring predicates matters very little to the philologist. What is 
important is that 'polysyllabic' is polysyllabic, i.e., that it contains many 
syllables. Self-referring predicates are important, albeit distributively, 
because they are predicates, not because they are self-referring. 
Furthermore, standard intuition tells us that the set of self-referring 
predicates is not an important category of predicates. If the set of self-
referring predicates were an important category of predicates, then self-
reference would have to be something more than an incidental feature of 
a predicate's reference. Apart from how the various self-referring 
predicates classify themselves, there would have to be some other 
significant classificatory feature associated with being self-referring and 
shared by all self-referring predicates. For instance, if 'polysyllable's' self-
8 Ryle, op. cit, p. 50. 
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reference were to be anything more than incidental, then there must be 
some significant classificatory feature other than being polysyllabic 
associated with its self-reference and shared by all other self-referring 
predicates. On the other hand, if the only relevant classificatory feature 
for determining the self-reference of a predicate is how that predicate 
classifies itself, then its being self-referring is nothing more than an 
incidental feature of its reference. 
What follows is this: For self-reference to be anything more than 
incidental, there would have to be a context of classification in which a 
predicate like 'polysyllabic' could be self-referring simply because it is 
judged similar to all other self-referring predicates. (For to say that a 
classificatory feature is significant means only that there is some context in 
which objects are judged similar with respect to that feature.) But how 
might all self-referring predicates be similar? Certainly not in being 
polysyllabic, nor in being either polysyllabic or orthographic or English etc. 
The only conceivable feature which could be shared by all self-referring 
predicates is the feature of being merely self-referring. In effect, there 
would have to be a context of classification in which being nothing more 
than self-referring could be a significant classificatory feature, a context in 
which self-referring predicates could be nothing more than self-referring 
and judged similar independently of how each individual predicate 
classifies itself. 
The problem here is that the existence of a context in which a 
predicate could be nothing more than self-referring violates standard 
intuition. Intuition tells us that there is no self-reference apart from how a 
predicate classifies itself as a member of its own extension. Moreover, how 
a predicate classifies the members of its extension is all that is relevant in 
determining its self-reference. For instance, all that is important in 
connection with 'polysyllabic' being self-referring is that it is polysyllabic. 
There is no other significant classificatory feature, like being merely self-
referring, to be considered. Accordingly, it is inconceivable that there 
could be any significant classificatory feature other than how an individual 
predicate classifies itself associated with being self-referring. It simply 
runs against intuition that self-reference is anything more than an 
incidental feature of a predicate's reference or that it identifies an 
important kind of predicate. 
Thus, there is no intuitive support for the claim that 'homological' and 
'heterological* are predicates of ordinary language. Furthermore, current 
usage indicates that whatever value is attributed to the self-reference of a 
predicate is derived from how it classifies itself, that it is of a kind that 
classifies itself is incidental. Of course, neither current usage nor linguistic 
intuition is immune to revision. A set we take to be an extension of a 
predicate may be lowered to the status of a mere collection, and a set we 
take to be a mere collection may be elevated to the status of an extension 
of a predicate. So my argument does not prove categorically that neither 
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'heterological* nor 'homological' are predicates of ordinary linguistic 
usage. 
Fortunately, I do not have to provide this proof in order to block the 
inference to Grelling's paradox. I need only show that it does not logically 
follow that 'heterological' and 'homological' are predicates of ordinary 
language because they may be taken as predicates within a system which 
provides a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classification of 
the predicates of ordinary language. This I have done. 
A system, after all, is a construct. The labels a system employs as 
predicates to categorize its realm achieve the status of predicates within a 
language only if the system meets the challenge set before it. The 
challenge for our heterological/homological system is to show that 
ordinary linguistic usage is inconsistent. To meet this challenge, the 
system would have to provide a genuine interpretation of ordinary 
linguistic usage. In this context, what is required is that the labels directly 
responsible for the paradox must be antecedently established predicates 
of ordinary linguistic usage. In other words, the system is successful in 
demonstrating the inconsistency of ordinary linguistic usage only if 
'heterological' and 'homological' are antecedently established predicates 
of ordinary linguistic usage. I have demonstrated that they are not. 
Accordingly, the system is not successful in proving that ordinary language 
is inconsistent because it does not establish 'heterological' and 
'homological' as predicates or ordinary language. 
It does not follow that we must ask of 'heterological' and 'homological' 
whether they are heterological or homological simply because we can ask 
(and in some cases even answer) the question of the predicates of ordinary 
language. We need only recognize that the system in which such a 
question would arise is a congeries of systems as neither 'heterological' nor 
'homological' are predicates of ordinary linguistic usage. 
